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We relate the degree of investor portfolio focus to the broader urban economic context of the
household. Using a detailed panel of investors in Sweden over the period 1995 to 2000, we find that
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average correlation among holdings, is partially explained by city industrial characteristics. We find
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investor focus, including behavioral biases, real and perceived informational advantage, local social
competition and hedging of non-tradable risk. We find little evidence to support social and hedging
motives to explain the lack of portfolio diversification, and some evidence in favor of perceived
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"knowledge-spillover" processes documented in the recent urban economics literature. Portfolio
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Introduction 
 
Urban economics in recent years has taught us a lot about the economic function of cities, 
from their special capacity as engines of enterprise, to the role they play in stimulating the 
acquisition of labor skills and knowledge. For example, by bringing firms from a variety of 
industries together in  a single location, cities present a wider array of opportunities for 
employment, even while attracting a motivated labor force to compete for these jobs.   By the 
same token, by bringing firms within a single industry together, cites have been shown to 
compound the potential for technological development.  Papers over the past decade by Edward 
Glaeser and co-authors in particular have explored the role that geographical concentration plays 
in innovation and the transfer of knowledge.
2  Testing whether industrial concentration or 
diversification are determinants of economic growth, these papers emphasize the benefits of 
knowledge spillover in an urban setting and the role of density in skill development. For 
example, Glaeser et al. (1992) show that industrial competition rather than concentration is a 
determining factor in growth, and Glaeser and Maré (2001) find empirical evidence suggesting 
that  the development of human capital within cities is the major vector of  growth.  Taken 
together, this work and the work of others in the field suggest that skill development and 
knowledge transfer may well be the key determinant of urbanism.   
The economic influence of cities on both enterprise and human capital is so important 
that it is natural to ask whether its effects can be documented in the financial portion of the 
household investment portfolio.  More broadly, urbanism itself might be viewed as having an 
impact on investing.   The cross-sectional differences afforded by urban vs. rural locations as 
well as the cross-sectional differences among cities themselves should  allow us to test some 
basic theories about how and why people invest in financial assets.  These theories can be 
broadly divided into those concerned with risk and return. 
 
Risk 
Neo-classical portfolio theory emphasizes the risk-reducing role of the investment 
portfolio.  Ross’s (1978)  K-fund  separation theory,  for instance, posits that all investors will 
hold some combination of diversified investment funds – at least in a frictionless world where all 
                                                 
2  See, for example,  Ellison and Glaeser, 1999,  Glaeser et al. 1992, 1995, 1997 and 2002, Glaeser and Mare, 2001.     2 
assets are traded and returns correspond to a quite general set of distributions.  With non-traded 
human capital, and frictions like the high costs of re-location or search costs for selling a home, 
answers to the household portfolio problem are more complicated.  The financial portion of the 
investment portfolio becomes a potential tool for hedging non-financial income risk.
3    
Besides standard macro and micro economic risks, recent research has also posited a 
geographically based “social risk.”   Bakshi and Chen (1996) for example, build an economy in 
which investors are motivated by the social status of wealth – presumably with respect to their 
geographical neighbors.
4     DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer (2002) term this regional factor in the 
investment motive “district risk.”  Thus, cities can be seen not only as a technology for 
diversifying human capital risk, but also as a medium for stimulating social competition with 
investment implications.  These two effects suggest that the financial diversification of urban 
investors is likely to be different from that of rural investors.  By the same token, under these 
various hedging stories, cities that have more focused economies might be expected to have 
investors whose portfolios effectively hedge out the focus of the city economy.   
 
Return 
The other side of investment is expected return.   People invest in financial assets to make 
money, not simply to insure themselves against shocks to labor income or other sources of 
uncertainty.  Under the assumption of efficient markets, speculation in individual securities is 
expected to yield no higher rate of return than provided by a diversified portfolio. However, with 
asymmetric information, diversification is not necessarily an optimal investment strategy.   
Recent behavioral studies have suggested that the average speculator in stocks does not profit by 
trading on his ideas (Barber and Odean, 2000). However, this does not appear to prevent the 
majority of investors from focusing their stock portfolios into only a few, correlated securities 
(cf. Goetzmann and Kumar, 2002).   
One potential reason for this portfolio concentration is the existence of actual or 
perceived informational advantage.  Given that knowledge spillover is a major characteristic of 
cities, one might expect to find portfolio concentration in urban, rather than rural settings.  
                                                 
3  Recent work on the financial portfolio as hedging instrument includes, DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer, 2002, 
Heaton and Lucas, 2000, a&b, and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002a, as well as a broader literature on precautionary 
savings, including Carroll and Samwick, 1997 and Carroll and Kimball, 2001. 
4 This is similar to the idea of “keeping up with the Joneses” (Ryder and Heal, 1973 and Gali, 1994).   3 
Because much business is still largely conducted through personal interaction, cities continue to 
be  settings for the creation and propagation of  value-relevant information and skills.  This is not 
to say that knowledge is not created in rural settings, but density of enterprise and a critical level 
of personal interaction are needed for diffusion and utilization of that knowledge.   Thus, 
investment opportunities may be expected to appear more frequently in an urban environment, 
and to yield economic returns  to those who seize them.   In this context, the investment 
portfolio might be thought of as capital for exploiting short-lived investment ideas.  A caveat to 
“don’t put all of your eggs in one basket” is that you may know something special about one 
particular basket.  Hence, we might expect urban households with access to knowledge spillover 
to use their investment portfolio to take advantage of this knowledge.     
It is important to note that, for most investors, these investment opportunities created in 
an “information-dense” business environment might be illusory. Investors with access to 
business information flow about a particular company may not know whether  the current 
security price already reflects this new information or not.  In fact, they may be subject to 
behavioral biases such as over-confidence or mistaken self-attribution that would lead them to 
believe incorrectly that they have superior investment knowledge. Thus, unless investment 
activity is completely characterized by unbiased, rational expectations about returns, we may not 
find that urban investors perform better on average than rural investors. Since most people 
believe themselves to have above average skill, we might expect to find more focused, 
speculative portfolios among investors regularly exposed to information – whether they are truly 
mediocre investors or not. 
Another feature we might expect from informed -- or seemingly informed -- trading on 
urban knowledge spill-over is investment in local industry.  Zhu (2002) documents the 
propensity of speculators to trade in stocks close to where they live and finds little evidence that 
trading in localized shares yields higher profits. Academic interest in geographically proximate 
investing has been growing, however.  Coval and Moskowitz (2001) find evidence of positive 
returns to institutional trading close to home.  Ivkovic and Weisbrenner (2003) report that 
investor holdings in local stocks outperform distant holdings. The debate about whether local 
investors actually profit from geographical information diffusion is still not settled, however, 
most researchers agree that investors at least  tend to behave as if they  believed they had 
superior information about local firms.   4 
  
Contribution of the Current Work 
A major challenge to exploring the relationship between investment portfolios and 
geographical location has been the lack of comprehensive  and detailed data.   Do investors  
hedge human capital risks with financial investments? Are urban portfolios more diversified than 
rural portfolios? These are empirical questions  that rely upon data  which, to date, have been 
difficult to obtain. Testing requires not only  a detailed knowledge of the assets in the financial 
portfolio but also information about employment, housing, geographical location and even 
demographic characteristics.  If people are optimizing over all the relevant economic factors in 
their lives, how would we know without  having an embarrassing  amount of  personal detail to 
study? 
In fact, in this paper we have access to a very detailed geo-coded panel dataset  over the 
period 1995 to 2000 for a large sample of  households in Sweden.  Constructed from several 
sources, this dataset allows us to explore the geographical determinants of  investment.  We seek 
to address  the question of how cities affect  household risk and return, and how these effects are 
manifested in the choice of a diversified vs. a focused investment portfolio.  We use the panel 
data to test a number of implications about both the risk and return stories presented above.  Our 
findings suggest that, in general,  city investors are more focused (less-diversified) and that the 
tendency to focus the portfolio increases with the degree to which the city itself is industry-
focused.   Our results are consistent with the hypothesis of real or perceived local knowledge 
spillover.  We test for “district effects” by considering whether portfolio focus depends upon a 
city’s  relative economic prosperity, and find little support for this theory.  On balance, our 
findings suggest that the composition of investor stock portfolios does not reflect  hedging 
motives, but rather reflects expectations about  superior information-motivated return. 
Our results provide some potentially useful evidence on theories of agglomeration.  Cities 
appear to enhance risk-taking behavior based on the economic opportunities they offer – or 
appear to offer --  their inhabitants.   Moreover, we find that the very factors  economists have 
associated with urban growth --  particularly industry scale, diversity and concentration, are  
associated with investor risk-taking. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  In the next section, we discuss the 
literature related to our work with particular focus on the various theories that might explain   5 
investor focus, and the testable implications given our dataset.  Section 3 discusses the data, 
Section 4 describes the construction of the variables. Section 5 describes the estimation 
procedure. Section 6 reports the empirical results.  A brief conclusion follows. 
 
2. Background and Testable Hypotheses 
 
2.1 Some alternative approaches to portfolio under-diversification  
One rational explanation for apparently under-diversified investor portfolios is a hedging 
argument.   Merton (1971) for example, shows that, in the presence of non-financial income risk 
investors will  hold the market portfolio and some additional position constructed to hedge the 
changes in the stochastic opportunity set or other sources of uncertainty. For example, an 
investor subject to income risk may try to diversify it away by holding, in addition to the market 
portfolio, a portfolio negatively correlated to his labor income.  The net overall financial 
portfolio may appear undiversified, when in fact the investor has reduced the overall risk of his 
portfolio.   The hedging motive predicts that  under-diversification should be related to non-
investment income risks. We are able to test this with the current dataset. 
A second explanation for portfolio focus  is   motivated by asymmetric information.   
Investors may hold focused portfolios because they either possess value-relevant information, or 
believe they possess value relevant information. Superior information about a few securities 
implies a portfolio concentrated in those securities (Grinold and Kahn, 1999).  Even the mistaken 
belief by the investor that information in his possession can provide superior returns will 
motivate a deviation from a diversified portfolio.   
A third explanation relies on prospect theory and, in general, on the preference for 
skewness.  Shore and White (2002) and Polkovnichenko (2003) point out those investors with a 
taste for low-probability high-stakes gambles  will invest only in the very few stocks from which 
they expect higher returns, forfeiting the benefits of diversification in return for a chance at great 
wealth.  Perhaps the investment accounts of individuals in our sample are, in effect, gambling 
accounts which lose their attractiveness to investors once they become too diversified to provide 
returns well in excess of the market.   Strange as the suggestion may seem, this might be rational 
for some form of utility function.   6 
A fourth explanation for under-diversification is bounded rationality.  Goetzmann and 
Kumar (2002) find that less sophisticated investors are also less diversified. Barber and Odean 
(2003) find that investors tend to trade more frequently in stocks in the news – suggesting either 
non-trivial information costs to investment research, or uncritical use of the current news.  The 
direct implication of bounded-rationality theories is a strong correlation between familiarity and 
investment in stocks (Merton, 1987 and Shapiro, 2000).   In fact, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) 
document just such a familiarity bias in Finland using a similarly geo-coded investor dataset.  If 
investor interest drops off with the distance fro the company, individual portfolios will tend to be 
regionally focused, and thus exposed to more volatility than they should be.  This is a question 
we can put to the data. 
A fifth explanation is a theory of social competition.  The theory of district risk argues 
that investors -- competing for local resources within their district -- have utility that depends on 
both their own wealth as well as the aggregate district wealth (DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer, 
2002). In their model, investors, in order to keep up with their neighbors,  invest in the same 
stocks in which their neighbors invest, resulting in an un-diversified portfolio.
5  The district risk 
theory postulates that the higher the growth of wealth of the district, the higher the local 
(consumption) prices, the more investors would concentrate on the same stocks. This suggests a 
strong positive correlation between the growth and change in wealth of the local district and the 
degree of under-diversification. It is important to note that this theory assumes away the mere 
possibility of migration across districts, while we will argue that this is one of the main 
components of the story.  Our approach to testing this is to examine the correlations between the 
economic performance of the district and the degree of diversification of the investors within it.   
It is important to notice that in Sweden investors are not forced or induced to own 
company stocks. This is not only confirmed by casual evidence collected by the authors, but also 
by the data. Moreover, in general professional proximity (that is the degree to which a stock is 
close to the profession of the investor) does not induce investors to tilt their portfolio toward 
stocks of the company they work for or of companies belonging to the same industry. This 
suggests that investor loyalty and own company ownership do not provide a valid alternative 
explanation. 
                                                 
5 This argument does not quite explain focused portfolios, because one equilibrium is that all investors in a district 
might hold the market.  However, if keeping up with the Joneses depends upon seeking to keep up with the most 
successful investor  in the district, the extreme portfolio in a population is de facto undiversified.   7 
 
2.2 The city agglomeration approach 
As emphasized above, the economists have provided considerable evidence suggesting 
that knowledge creation and  knowledge spillover are the main determinants of city 
agglomeration and development (Glaeser, et al., 1992, Glaeser, et al., 2002, Glaeser and Mare, 
2001, Ellison and Glaeser, 1997, Glaeser, et al., 1995). Knowledge creation and spillover are 
defined in terms of professional specialization and proximity. Agglomeration economies, 
characterized by dynamic local externalities, increase the returns to investment in high labor-
capital intensive technologies and induce specialization.   
A major question addressed by urban economists is whether intra-industry or inter-
industry spillover is more important.   Glaeser et al. (1992) characterize the former as a Marshall, 
Arrow and Romer [MAR] model. Along these lines, Porter (1990) argues that the main 
determinant of g rowth is specialization.  Local monopoly increases growth as it allows 
externalities to be internalized.  On the other hand,  Jacobs (1969) links city growth to the 
existence of various and proximate industries, and  in tests of these off-setting propositions, 
Glaeser  et al., 1992  find that "important knowledge transfers come from outside the core 
industry''.   They find that cross-industry spillover as opposed to within-industry spillover is  the 
main driver to city growth.  
The archtypal MAR region is  Silicon Valley.  Concentration of the high-tech industry 
around San Jose, California generates knowledge spillover between firms in the same industry.  
Jacobs's model represents the development of industries that grow out of specialization of a 
particular p rocess. The example he gives is the brassiere industry, which evolved from the 
dressmakers' industry as opposed to the lingerie industry. An additional feature of the  Jacobs 
model is that it suggests that local competition induces knowledge creation and innovation.  The 
given example is the  Italian ceramics industry, in which technical and aesthetic innovation is 
driven by  intense, local competition among many similar firms.  
These theories disagree in terms of the form of the market most conducive to knowledge 
creation and specialization (i.e., competition as opposed to local monopoly). However, they do 
agree on relating growth to the process of knowledge creation and specialization.  While existing 
theories of urban economics focus on development of skills and stimulus for technological 
innovation, they apply equally well to the propagation of investment opportunities and ideas.   8 
Workers in both diversified and concentrated urban settings are likely to be exposed to value-
relevant information.  If this information is about publicly traded firms, then we would expect 
knowledge spillover to stimulate investment activity.   Whether this spill-over results in a 
portfolio with many or few stocks is somewhat ambiguous.    If the city employment is 
concentrated i n a few major firms, we might expect to find local investor portfolios highly 
concentrated.  However, if a city has a number of publicly traded companies and there is 
knowledge transfer among them, then local speculators might take a number of positions at once.  
 
2.3 A simple  model of specialization 
An important consideration in the question of portfolio focus and knowledge spill-over is 
that employment specialization itself has the potential to affect investment behavior.  Investment 
activities compete for the attention of the worker.  As specialization increases, and labor market 
competition rises, the time investors allocate to search for new stocks may decrease, even as the 
value-relevance – or apparent value-relevance – of acquired information increases.  In a MAR 
setting, for example, in which an investor acquires knowledge of the particular sector/industry, 
this  implies a lower search cost for the stocks of that industry, but a higher information search 
cost for stocks outside of the industry. 
To examine this issue in a bit more detail, we consider a search framework (Carlson and 
McAfee, 1983, Hortacsu and Syverson, 2002). We assume that investors have a certain wealth 
(W) to invest and a search cost ( x). The search cost may be alternatively seen as a discrete 
amount that has to be paid to enter a specific market.
6  Investors are risk averse and are aware 
that different stocks have different risk-return profiles, but are uncertain about the asset that 
represents the best next addition to the portfolio. Each stock has a specific risk-return profile (R) 
that is a function of the stock expected return, correlation and volatility. If we also assume that 
investors have identical perceptions of the risk-returns profiles of the different stocks, it can be 
shown (Hortacsu and Syverson, 2002) that an investor with W to invest and a search cost x will 
adopt the following investment rule: keep on investigating one additional stock if the cost of 
searching is less than the benefit, that is,   
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) x dF W R EU W R EU
R
i > - ￿
*
0
* , ,          (1) 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Ukhov (2002) for a model with a fixed investor cost of market entry.   9 
otherwise stop and invest in that stock. The intuition behind equation 1 is the existence of 
discreteness in the cost of investment that effectively segments the market and generates a 
discontinuity in the investment process. This approach assumes that the degree of portfolio 
diversification is mainly a function of the search cost to invest in a specific stock. Equation 1 
provides a stylized representation that contains all the elements of portfolio choice, but it is 
completely unlike the neo-classical portfolio problem, in that past choices are not re-evaluated in 
the context of current ones.  It has the feature of habit-formation in which the existing portfolio is 
the acquired habit. 
Investment in stocks provides three advantages: the first is that a search may turn up a 
genuine, undervalued security.  While insider trading laws may prevent the exploitation of this 
information, trading in the stocks of related companies exposed to such information may not be 
prohibited (Tookes, 2003).  The second is the reduction of the overall portfolio risk due to 
diversification. Therefore, if the investor is risk averse, he has an incentive to keep on searching 
and not to invest only in a single stock. A risk neutral investor will only care about the return 
payoff and will concentrate on one stock – it is well-known that the maximum expected return 
portfolio is a composed of a single security, however it is costly to continue to search for that 
highest-returning security. 
What is exactly the search cost? It is a function of the actual purchase of information as 
well as the time spent doing so. The latter increases with alternative opportunities the investor 
faces and, therefore, with the reward/opportunity ratio provided by his professional activity. 
Therefore, the more professionally involved the investor is, the less time he will have to devote 
to portfolio allocation. We can think of this in terms of bounded rationality (Simon, 1986, 
Sargent, 1993) or limited processing capacity (Sims, 2000). Building on Sims’ results in terms of 
limited processing capacity, Peng and Xiong (2002) show how limited capacity, defined in terms 
of time to process information, affects portfolio choice.  
The search cost is negatively related to the investor’s ability to get information. 
Therefore, in  a business setting in which an investor is naturally exposed to certain kind of 
information, professional, geographical and informational proximity are by-products of labor and 
thus reduce the search cost.   Even in a situation in which there is no excess return expected from 
an investment, if the search cost is discrete and high enough, an investor will forfeit the benefits 
of broader diversification and hold the few stocks related to his job – in a sense, free-riding on    10 
professional knowledge spillover. It thus follows that the degree of portfolio diversification is a 
direct function of the search cost. This simple model is consistent with existing empirical 
evidence showing that investors tend to invest in stocks of companies headquartered close to 
where they live (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, 2001, Hau, 2001) or of the country they come 
from (Bhattacharya and Groznik, 2001). Proximity may be seen as a proxy for lower search 
costs.  
The main implication of this simple model is to suggest portfolio diversification may be 
related to an  investor’s professional life. This allows us to link portfolio diversification to the 
process of city agglomeration and industrial specialization. We find evidence that the same 
factors that drive agglomeration are those that affect the professional lives of investors, and by 
extension, their search cost.  
 
3 The data 
 
In order to examine the relationship between urbanism and diversification, we require a 
set of variables that proxy for knowledge spillover and local prosperity, as well as a set of 
variables to test competing theories.  To test hypotheses about hedging, we require a measure of 
non-financial income risk by the investor, measures of the level and risk of non-financial income, 
as well as proxies for investor borrowing constraints. Theories related to information spillover 
and bounded rationality require proxies for the degree of professional and geographical 
proximity of the investor. The district risk theory requires a measure of local prosperity as well 
as investor specific wealth and sources of income. Finally, a fairly general set of individual 
investor control variables are needed. These will allow us to separately identify the impact of 
belonging to a particular district from the investor's specific characteristics. 
We collect data from different sources. For each investor we have detailed information 
about his or her individual holdings of stocks (broken down at the stock level), mutual funds, 
bank accounts, real estate and other types of wealth. Fiscal authorities  provide us with 
information on the different sources of  investor income, as well as demographic and family 
characteristics. This information is matched at the individual level, so as to construct a time 
series of investment and income for each investor. For each stock we have detailed information 
on the company and the price, volume and volatility at which it trades. We also use aggregated   11 
data on Swedish macro-economic conditions and on the indexes of the real estate market. We 
now explain the data sources more in detail. 
 
3.1 Individual stockholding 
We use the data on individual shareholders collected by Vardepappererscentralen (VPC), 
the Security Register Center. The data contain both stockholding held directly and in a street 
name, including holdings of US-listed ADRs. In addition, SIS Ägarservice AB collects 
information on ultimate owners of shares held via trusts, foreign holding companies and alike 
(for details see Sundin and Sundquist, 2002). Our data cover the period 1995-2000. Overall, the 
records provide information about the owners of 98% of the market capitalization of publicly 
traded Swedish companies. For the median company, we have information about 97.9% of the 
equity, and in the worst case we have information on 81.6% of market capitalization of the 
company. The data provided by SIS Ägarservice AB were linked by Statistics Sweden with the 
LINDA dataset described below. 
   
3.2 LINDA 
LINDA (Longitudinal INdividual DAtaset for Sweden) is a register-based longitudinal 
data set and is a joint endeavor between the Department of Economics at Uppsala University, 
The National Social Insurance Board (RFV), Statistics Sweden, and the Ministries of Finance 
and Labor. It consists of a large, representative panel of households for the population over the 
period 1960 to 2000. For each year, information on all family members of the sampled 
individuals is added to the data set. The sampling procedure ensures that the data are 
representative for each year. Moreover, the same family is traced over time. This provides a real 
time series dimension which, in general, is lacking in surveys based on different cohorts polled 
over time. 
The variables include individual characteristics (gender, age, marital status, country of 
birth, citizenship, year of immigration, place of residence detailed at the parish level, education, 
profession, employment status), housing information (type and size of housing, owner, rental and 
occupation status, one-family or several-family dwelling, year of construction, housing taxation 
value) and tax and wealth information. In particular, the income and wealth tax registers include 
information on labor income, capital gains and losses, business income and losses, pension   12 
contributions, taxes paid and taxable wealth. A detailed description of the dataset is provided by 
Edin and Fredriksson, (2000) and is available on the web site http://linda.nek.uu.se/. 
The tax aspect deserves more detailed discussion. In Sweden, in addition to income 
taxation, there exists an additional wealth tax which is paid by every investor with net worth in 
excess of 900,000 SEK (about US$90,000). The taxable wealth includes the tax-assessed value 
of real estate, market value of publicly listed securities, balance of bank accounts and fair value 
of valuable possessions (including jewelry, cars, antiques, etc.).  
For the purpose of this paper, we compute the current market value of housing using the 
tax-assessed value provided by LINDA. We evaluate it at current prices by using the average 
ratio of market value to tax-assessed value that is provided for each year and county by the 
Swedish Office of Statistics. There is no estimate of the market value of privately held 
companies. However, the data contains an indicator variable for owners of privately held 
companies and entrepreneurs who file their business tax return along with their personal tax 
return. For the privately held unlimited liability companies the value of the assets is included in 
the tax return. For the privately held unlimited liability companies that are not listed, the value of 
assets held is generally missing. However, the size of the group is rather small (1.74%-1.91% of 
the sample depending on a year) and is unlikely to affect our estimates in a significant way. 
Moreover, for the members of the wealthiest 5,000 families, we have been able to reconstruct 
their values and to correctly impute it by using information from SIS Ägarservice AB (Sundin 
and Sundquist, 2002). 
The combined LINDA/Shareholding dataset covers the period 1995-2000. The overall 
sample we use contains 1,757,406 observations. In addition, we also use 1990-1994 data from 
LINDA in the implementation of the Carroll and Samwick (1996) procedure to construct the 
moments of conditional non-financial income. In Table 1 we report some descriptive statistics. In 
particular, Panel A contains the general demographic characteristics (number of households for 
each year, members in household, adults in household, age of the oldest member of household, 
percent of the sample with secondary and higher education, percent of immigrants) as well the 
proxies for diversification (D1, D 2, D 3 and D 4). Panels B report the characteristics of the local 
districts in terms of the main variables we will focus on (i.e., number of active enterprises, 
competition, specialization, diversity,...). Panels C and D report, respectively,   the age and 
gender distribution of the sample and their wealth and income characteristics.    13 
   
3.3 Firm-level information and other data 
For individual security returns (including dividends) and the overall market index (SIX 
market index), we use the SIX Trust Database. For information on firm-level characteristics we 
use the Market Manager Partners Databases. These two databases are the equivalent of, 
respectively, CRSP and COMPUSTAT for the US. In addition, Market Manager Partners 
Databases contain information at the plant level, including municipality location of the plant. 
The consumer confidence index is provided by Statistics Sweden. Geographical coordinates are 
supplied by the Swedish Postal Service and contain latitude and longitude of Swedish Postal 
Offices. 
   
4 Construction of variables 
   
4.1 Measures of portfolio diversification 
We consider four measures of portfolio diversification. These are derived from 
Goetzmann and Kumar (2002). We refer to their paper for a proper description and the rationale 
of their use. The first measure (D1) is simply the number of positions in the portfolio (i.e., D1 = 
N). The second (D2) is constructed as: 
œ ß
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where N is the number of positions and  Corr is the average correlation of the stocks in the 
portfolio. It can be shown that D2 is just a normalized version of the portfolio variance multiplied 
by –1. It increases with the degree of diversification of the financial portfolio. Diversification 
increases when the variance is reduced. The variance can be reduced either by increasing the 
number of shares in the portfolio (N), or by selecting the stocks so as to reduce the average 
correlation among the stocks in the portfolio (Corr). In the limit as N goes to infinity the 
portfolio variance converges to the covariance among the stocks in the portfolio. 
The third and fourth measures (D3 and D4) are constructed as: 
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where wi is the weight of the stock in the portfolio of the investor and wmkt is the weight that the 
same stock would have in the market portfolio. They differ in the way wmkt is constructed. In the 
case of D3, wmkt3 is constructed by using the overall capitalization of the company, while in the 
case of  D4,  wmkt4 is constructed by using just the free float.
7 These measures express 
diversification in terms of divergence of the financial portfolio from the market portfolio of the 
investor. Higher diversification implies a divergence closer to zero. Both D3, and D4 are defined 
so that as diversification decreases, the measures become more negative. They will be very 
useful in terms of comparison with our measure of active hedging of non-financial income risk. 
We will indeed see how the distance from the market portfolio relates to the desire to hedge non-
financial income risk. All our measures of portfolio versification increase with the degree of 
diversification of the portfolio that is “a higher value of these variables is indicative of a higher 
level of diversification”. 
 
4.2 Measures of professional specialization 
To proxy for professional specialization, we use the measures similar to those developed 
by Glaeser  et al. (1992): specialization, competition, uniformity and diversity. We create a 
specialization variable as ratio of the share of the top five industries in local employment to the 
share of these same five industries in national employment.  Thus, the denominator of this 
variable differs across municipalities. This provides a measure of specialization at the 
municipality level. Competition is captured by the number of firms per employee in a 
municipality relative to the number of firms per employee in Sweden. As Glaeser et al. (1992) 
point out, this is not distinguishable from a relative scale variable, but should be correlated to the 
degree of firm competition for employees.  Our measure of diversity is somewhat different from 
that used by  Glaeser et al. (1992), since their study is conducted on industry-level data.  We 
proxy for diversity  using the negative of the share of the top 5 industries in municipal 
employment.   Cites with more diversity in employment beyond the top five industries by 
employment will have a higher value.  Glaeser  et al. (1992), using a sample of US cities, 
between 1956 and 1987, find that specialization and diversity reduce city growth, while 
                                                 
7 This is all the more relevant in a country like Sweden where a sizable fraction of the companies’ shares are in the 
hands of a restricted number of shareholders. 
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competition increases it. In order to assess how these variables affect city growth in our sample, 
we estimate an analogous regression
8 for Sweden.  Our estimation of this relationship for 
Sweden (not reported) suggests that all three variables are associated with the growth rate of the 
city.  
  We also construct variables that proxy for the degree of “isolation” of the local district. 
These are meant to describe how isolated the district is with respect to major financial and 
information centers. These measures are: the index of rural areas, the distance from the closest 
civilian airport and the population density. The index of rural areas is the Urban Code as reported 
by Statistics Sweden. It ranges from 1 in the case of a Metropolitan area to 9 in the case of the 
countryside. The distance to the closest civilian airport is measured as the logarithm of the 
distance between airport and central post office in the district. Population density  is the 
population (in tens of thousands) per square kilometer.     
 
4.3 Measures of local prosperity 
  We consider six variables that measure the degree of prosperity of the district in a given 
year: the percentage of new start-ups, the percentage of bankruptcies, the number of enterprises 
active in the district, the employment growth and some measures of profitability of the 
companies operating in the district (i.e., the profitability of sales and the return on capital). These 
variables are constructed at the firm level and aggregated at the district level. As an alternative 
measure of local prosperity we also considered local consumption price indexes. This would be 
the variable required by the district risk hypothesis. However, this variable is very highly 
correlated to the other variables of local prosperity. We therefore omit it in the reported 
specification. 
 
4.4 Measures of financial and municipal services availability 
The degree of financial sophistication and bank coverage of a district provide a good 
proxy for both the availability of financial information and the vitality of the local economy 
(Garmaise and Moskowitz, 2003). In order to proxy for the availability of  financial services, we 
include the degree of bank coverage. It is constructed as follows. We first identify the list of 
                                                 
8 While for Glaeser et al. (1992) the unit of measure is the industry-level data, we focus on municipality-level data. 
These results, that replicate Table 3 in Glaeser et al. (1992) using this alternative specification are available upon 
request from the authors   16 
credit institutions as reported by the Finance Inspection (Swedish equivalent of SEC) and then 
we calculate, for each municipality, the number of branches that each institution has for a given 
year. The resulting variable “Bank Coverage” is the logarithm of 1 + the number of branches per 
district. To proxy for the degree of availability of municipal services, we use the percentage of 
the population that is employed by the municipality. 
 
4.5 Non-financial risk variables. 
We define as non-financial risk variables those that allow us to test for portfolio choice in 
the presence of non-financial income risk (cf. Heaton and Lucas, 2000). We consider three 
variables. The first variable an the index of  investor  hedging ( i G ). It measures the extent to 
which the investor’s portfolio differs from the market portfolio in terms of correlation with 
investor's non-financial risk. It is constructed as: 
) , ( ) , ( ,port i i m i i r Y corr r Y corr - = G , 
where rm is the return on the market portfolio, ri,port is the return on the financial portfolio of the 
ith investor and Yi is the investor non-financial expected income. In the Appendix we provide a 
detailed description of how this variable is constructed.  i G  proxies for the change in correlation 
between financial and non-financial risk induced by investor’s portfolio choice and quantifies the 
extent to which the investor deviates from a passive strategy. It is positive in the case of active 
hedging and captures the contribution of portfolio choice to the reduction of the overall investor's 
risk.  
The second variable is a measure of borrowing constraints.  Standard portfolio theory 
links portfolio choice and market participation to the existence of borrowing constraints. Our 
proxy for these is the ratio of investor debt to total assets. It is constructed at the investor level at 
time t. The third proxy for non-financial risk is the percentage of the population in the district 
that is enrolled in welfare programs. It proxies for the risk of unemployment that comes from the 
fact of living in a depressed area. It is worth stressing that this is above and beyond the risk of 
unemployment that each individual investor perceives. The latter is constructed for each investor 
and included among the control variables (see below).  
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4.6 Measures of familiarity 
The index of familiarity ( i Y ) represents the degree of “professional” or “geographical 
proximity” to a particular stock. In the case of professional proximity, the index is a dummy 
taking the value 1 if the investor’s profession is in the same area of activity as the company 
whose stock is under consideration and zero otherwise. We use the one digit SNI92 codes 
(similar to SIC codes) to identify the areas of activities. For example, for an investor working in 
the mining sector who holds the stock of a mining firm, the dummy would be equal to 1. 
In the case of geographical proximity, we use the proximity between the residence of the 
investor and the place where the company is located. We consider two different measures: the 
first one is the logarithm of the inverse of the distance between the ZIP code of the investor and 
the ZIP code of the closest branch/subsidiary of the company whose stock we consider. As an 
alternative measure, we use the logarithm of the inverse of the distance between the ZIP code of 
the investor and the ZIP code of the company headquarter. Given that the results do not differ 
and the variables are highly collinear, we report only the first specification. These measures are 
analogous to those proposed by Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001) in a study of geographical 
preferences in mutual fund investment. The greater the value of the variable, the closer the 
investor is to the stock. These measures are constructed at the stock level and then aggregated at 
the investor level, across all the stocks of his portfolio, weighting them by their share in the 
portfolio. This procedure delivers three measures of familiarity for each investor and time. 
 
4.7 Control variables 
We consider the following sets of control variables: measures of income and wealth, 
contemporaneous gain/loss variables, demographic variables, momentum variables, and 
macroeconomic and social variables. 
The measures of wealth include the overall level of wealth of the investor and  a 
decomposition by components. Overall wealth is defined as the sum of financial and real estate 
wealth. The measures of income variance include the variance of labor and entrepreneurial 
income of the investor and the correlations between them and financial and real estate income. In 
order to make the results comparable with the standard literature on portfolio choice in the 
presence of non-financial income risk, we construct measures of the permanent (expected) non-  18 
financial income following the approach of Carrol and Samwick (1997) and Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2001). In the Appendix we provide a brief description of the methodology. We consider non-
financial income to be labor income and entrepreneurial income. We also construct a measure of 
unemployment risk that proxies for the probability of being unemployed in the following year. It 
is the one year-ahead forecast of a linear probability model where the unemployment status (i.e., 
1 if unemployed and zero otherwise) is regressed on demographic variables, measures of income 
and wealth and regional, geographic and professional dummies. 
As an additional robustness check, we also replicated our results by using the actual 
levels of non-financial income, their volatilities and the correlation of financial and non-financial 
incomes. This replaces the measures of permanent income, volatility of income and their 
correlations with portfolio returns that had been constructed according to the Carrol and 
Samwick (1997) methodology we described earlier. Given that the results are consistent, we will 
report only those based on the Carrol and Samwick methodology.  
The momentum variables include the return of the portfolio of the investor and of the 
market portfolio in the previous 12 months. These variables are meant to control for the 
possibility that the change in the degree of portfolio diversification or portfolio choice (i.e., 
familiarity bias) is due to momentum, that is, changes to the variation in the value of the stock 
market or in the value of the portfolio holdings. 
The demographic variables include: the level of education of the investor, broken down 
into high-school and university level, the age of the oldest member of the family of the investor 
and its value squared. This latter variable is consistent with standard results (Guiso and Jappelli, 
2002, Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002) which find a non-linear relationship between age and the degree 
of stock market participation. We also include a measure of unemployment risk that proxies for 
the probability of being unemployed in the following year. It is the one-year-ahead forecast of a 
linear probability model where the unemployment status (i.e., 1 if unemployed and zero 
otherwise) is regressed on demographic variables, measures of income and wealth and regional, 
geographical and professional dummies. 
To control for the effect of the local economy, we also include a Stockholm and an 
immigration dummy. The Stockholm dummy takes the value of 1 if the investor lives in the 
capital and 0 otherwise. The immigration dummy takes the value 0 if all the members of the 
household are native Swedes, and 1 if at least one member of household immigrated from   19 
abroad. Furthermore, we construct a variable to proxy for the ability of the investor in his 
occupation. This is based on the difference between his income and the average income of his 
profession. The assumption is that the higher the income of the investor relative to the average 
income of the other investors in the same area, the higher his ability should be. 
We also consider macroeconomic and social variables. The macroeconomic variable is 
the Index of Consumer Confidence. The social variables include the local tax rate and the 
percentage of foreign-born households. The local tax rate controls for disparities across districts 
merely due to tax treatment. The percentage of foreign-born in the population of the district 
controls for the assistances provided to the immigrants. It can be particularly relevant in some 
areas of the country. We also include a variable that reports the number of injured in auto 
accidents per km of the roads, as reported by the Ministry of Industry, Employment and 
Communications. This allows us to control for some outside background risk.  
 
5 Econometric methodology 
 
We concentrate on the following specification: 
  it it Y e a + + + =
Y
it it ?C ßA ,           (2) 
where Yit is alternatively one of our measures of portfolio diversification or one of our proxies of 
familiarity (i.e., professional and geographical proximity). The matrix Ait contains the sets of 
variables we are interested in (i.e., proxies of professional specialization, local prosperity, local 
welfare assistance and degree of isolation). The matrix 
Y
it C contains all the control variables (i.e., 
income, wealth, momentum, demographic and macroeconomic variables). 
The econometric estimation of equation (2) has to account for the selection bias due to 
the fact that we do not observe the investment decision of investors who do not participate in the 
financial market. Given that the participation decision is endogenous, the standard estimates of 
equation (2) would be biased (Maddala, 1983, Nijman and Verbeek, 1996). To address this issue 
we use a  Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure and separately estimate the factors associated 
with holding stocks and what influences his choices of assets. The decision to enter the market 
can be represented as:  
it it P e a + + + =
P
it it ?C ßA ,            (3)   20 
where Pit is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the investor participates in the financial market 
and zero otherwise, Ait is defined as before, while 
P
it C contains the vector of control variables.
9 
The probability that the investor enters the financial market (Pit) is modeled as a normal c.d.f., 
defined on an expanded dataset that contains both households who hold financial assets and 
households who do not. The expanded dataset includes the totality of the households tracked 
over time over each of the sample years 1995 through 2000, regardless of whether they invested 
in the stock market. It totals 1,757,406 households-year observations. 
From the estimation of equation (3) we derive a variable ( it l ) that is employed in the 
second stage to control for the selection bias (see Heckman, 1979). The significance of the 
estimate of  it l  provides a test of the null of no sample selection bias. The results show that in all 
the specifications  it l  is always strongly significant, suggesting that self-selection is indeed 
important in the sample. We will therefore estimate: 
it it it Y e dl a + + + + =
Y
it it ?C ßA ,               (4) 
Given that equation (3) is just an auxiliary regression only needed for the proper 
estimation of the second stage, but out of the scope of this paper, for brevity we will not report 
the results and we will focus on specification (4). A few results are, however, worth mentioning. 
Professional specialization always increases stock market participation. This result holds across 
all the different specifications and for both the low wealth and the high wealth investors.  Local 
isolation reduces stock market participation, while local prosperity has an ambiguous impact. 
Higher company profitability reduces stock market participation, while an increase in the number 
of companies raises stock market participation. This is consistent with the fact that if the 
industrial area is thriving, local investors are more likely to invest in their own business and to 
start their own enterprises and ventures than to invest in the stock market. On the contrary, an 
increase in the number of companies, by providing better job opportunities and higher 
                                                 
9  P
it C differs from Y
it C  only in terms of some variables that provide the identification restriction in the Heckman 
specification.  P
it C  also contains time dummies, macro-regions, industry dummies and the correlations between non-
financial income and the market portfolio. That is, the correlations between labor income and entrepreneurial labor 
income and the market portfolio and the correlation between the investor's real estate and the market portfolio. 
Y
it C also contains the prior 12 month returns and volatility of the investor's portfolio, his prior capital gains and 
losses separately considered, and his tax rate.  The main implicit assumption is that the participation decision is a 
function of the market portfolio (i.e., its correlations), while the portfolio decision is a function of the individual 
stocks.    21 
employment raises stock market participation. This is controlling for individual wealth (both 
financial and real estate) and for the level and volatility of income (labor and entrepreneurial).  
Considering the potential endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables, we use an 
instrumental variable estimation.
10  In order to control  for heteroskedasticity, we correct the 
standard errors in the second stage regression. We therefore use a two stage least squares with a 
consistent variance-covariance matrix. We employ data disaggregated at the individual investor 
level. 
   
6. Main results 
 
We proceed in two steps. First, we consider the determinants of portfolio diversification. 
This allows us to directly compare evidence in favor of the different theories described above. 
This first part of the analysis, while it addresses the question of why investors might hold few 
stocks in their portfolio, however, does not explain which stocks they invest in. Therefore, the 
second part of the analysis addresses the issue of stock-selection. That is, we relate the drive to 
invest in local or familiar s tocks to the degree of professional specialization and city 
agglomeration.  
  
6.1 Determinants  of portfolio under-diversification  
We regress our measures of portfolio diversification on the proxies for local professional 
specialization, local prosperity, financial and municipal service availability and the non-financial 
risk variables, as well as a set of control variables meant to control for investors’ idiosyncratic 
wealth, income and demographic characteristics and for geographic and country shocks. The 
results are reported in Tables 2-6. In particular, Table 2 contains the main specification for the 4 
measures of portfolio diversification (respectively for the different measures of portfolio 
diversification  D1, D 2, D 3, and  D4) for the entire sample. Tables 3 -6 report the main 
specifications for the different measures of portfolio diversification, with the sample broken 
down into low-wealth and wealthy investors. For each class of investors we consider four 
alternative specifications differing on the basis of the control variables that are used. We will 
mostly focus on the complete specification with all controls -- Specification 1 in the tables. The 
                                                 
10 Lagged variables and a set of demographic variables, industry and time dummies are used as instruments.   22 
results broadly support the city agglomeration theory and the limited information theory, while 
they fail to support the standard portfolio theory and the district risk theory.  
The first finding is a significant negative correlation between portfolio diversification and 
our urban measures of professional specialization. This holds overall and for the different classes 
of investors. Industrial specialization and competition negatively relate to portfolio 
diversification. That is, the more concentrated in a particular area the industry is, the higher the 
degree of local competition for employees and the higher the labor concentration, the lower is the 
degree of portfolio diversification. This result is robust across all specifications and for different 
measures of portfolio diversification for low-wealth investors. It also holds for high-wealth 
investors when we use D3 and D4 as proxies for portfolio diversification, while it is not always 
significant when we use D1 and D2. This may be due to the fact that, since high-wealth investors 
are more financially sophisticated, crude measures of diversification such as D1 and D2 are not 
able to capture the extent of the investor’s portfolio policies. The effect of industry diversity is 
consistently negative for the low-wealth investors for D1 and D2 and insignificant otherwise. This 
lack of significance may be due to the relatively high correlation between this variable and the 
specialization variable.  The results on specialization, competition and diversity are striking in 
that they are the same factors related in previous research to knowledge spillover and urban 
growth.   
As the tables indicate,  diversification decreases significantly with the growth of 
competition, specialization and diversity. Thus, a one standard deviation increase in our measure 
of  competition leads to  a decrease in diversification of 2.2%, 0.5%, 1.7% and 2.0% for the 
measures of diversification D 1, D 2, D 3, D 4, respectively. Similarly, one standard deviation 
increase in specialization leads to a  1.1%, 0.2%, 1.6% and 1.5% for the corresponding measures 
of diversification.  The effect of diversity seems to be smaller at less than 1%. 
It is interesting to compare these findings to the results from the first stage: professional 
specialization increases stock market participation, but reduces portfolio diversification. This is 
consistent with the spill-over hypothesis. In particular, it suggests that the very process of city 
growth generates more – perhaps illusory - investment opportunities for the investors who rush 
to invest into them. This simultaneously increases stock market participation and portfolio 
concentration.   23 
The results about the measures of local prosperity are also interesting. Local prosperity 
may induce two effects: on the one hand it increases investors’ wealth and therefore financial 
sophistication. On the other hand, it raises the incentive to invest in local stocks. The latter may 
be due to an incentive to catch-up with the neighbors as the local-district theory would suggest, 
or to an incentive to increase the stakes in locally successful enterprises. This would be 
particularly true for the variables representing the number of local start-ups, local bankruptcies 
and local sale profitability. These variables proxy for the existence of successful local companies 
in which it is worth investing. A typical example would be an area like Silicon Valley, where we 
would expect most of the local investors to be highly invested on successful local companies. In 
this case, we would expect a negative relationship between local prosperity and diversification.  
The results hold overall and for the different classes of investors and are particularly 
strong for the low-wealth investors. A one standard deviation increase in the number of startups 
(employment growth) leads to a  5.6% (1%) decrease in average correlation. The effect is 
noticeably stronger for wealthy households.  Thus,  a  one standard deviation increase in 
bankruptcies rate leads to a  4.0% decrease in average correlation (D2) for the low wealth 
households, and a 4.6% decrease for the high wealth households.  
The findings show that portfolio diversification increases with the prosperity of the local 
area. There is, indeed, a positive relationship between portfolio diversification and employment 
growth, the number of new start-ups, the measures of profitability of local establishment (Sales 
Profitability and Return on Capital) and the number of active enterprises. An increase in 
bankruptcies on the other hand reduces diversification. It is also worth remembering that if we 
consider  local consumption prices  as a proxy for local prosperity there is a  strong positive 
correlation between prosperity and portfolio diversification. The results hold overall as well as 
for different classes of investors and are particularly strong for  low-wealth investors. 
These findings do not support the district risk theory, which postulates a negative 
relationship between local prosperity and portfolio diversification. However, they support the 
information story. Indeed, it is likely that more information is generated in more prosperous 
districts. For example, newspapers may be established, brokers and financial analysts may flock 
in, banks may increase the number of their branches and the number of financial services 
provided. This would reduce the search cost and therefore increase portfolio diversification.    24 
A further element to support the limited information theory is the strong, positive and 
statistically significant relationship between portfolio diversification and availability of financial 
services. That is, the higher the degree of bank coverage, the more investors are likely to 
diversify their portfolios. This holds across all the measures of diversification and  for both 
classes of investors. A one standard deviation increase in the number of banking branches in a 
municipality leads to an average diversification  increase between 1.4 and 2.0%. Moreover, the 
effect is stronger for high-wealth households. Thus, the number of assets increases 3.5% for high 
wealth households vs. 0.8% for low-wealth households. 
It is worth stressing that in these specifications we are also controlling for the wealth and 
income of the investors. Therefore, these effects are “district effects” that act over and above the 
individual wealth and income effects. Analogously, our proxy for the availability of public 
services (the percentage of  municipal employees) is mostly
11 positively related to portfolio 
diversification.  
What do these results tell us in terms of standard portfolio theory? They suggest that 
diversification increases at the very time when either non-financial income risk decreases 
(reduction in the number of bankruptcies, increase in growth and profitability) or its effects are 
alleviated by the existence of public services or of a financial network. This runs against standard 
portfolio theory. Indeed, this theory would suggest that portfolio diversification should be greater 
when non-financial risk is higher. Areas characterized by a high employment growth rate, high 
start-up rate, and low bankruptcy rate should be areas characterized by low non-financial income 
risk and should therefore display lower financial diversification. Indeed, if the local economy is 
prosperous and growing, the risk of unemployment and well as the risk of a wage reduction 
should be lower. Therefore, portfolio diversification should be lower. The findings point in the 
opposite direction.  
The percentage of people on welfare assistance impacts investors differently, depending 
on their level of wealth. It is always negative and statistically significant for the high-wealth 
investors and either not significant (for D1 and D2) or positive for the low-wealth investors (for 
D3 and D4). This provides some partial evidence of an impact of non financial risk for low-
wealth investors.   
                                                 
11 This holds for D2 ,D3 and D4 , for both classes of investors. However, it is mostly insignificant in the case of D1.   25 
These findings provide some preliminary and mixed evidence on standard portfolio 
theory in the presence of background risk. In order to further examine this issue, we need to 
consider the relationship between portfolio diversification and  non-financial income risk 
hedging. This is represented by the correlation between our measures of portfolio diversification 
and  i G . The results are very striking. They show no correlation between hedging and portfolio 
diversification for the low-wealth investors and a negative correlation for the high wealth 
households and for the entire sample. These results are very robust across different specifications 
and alternative measures of portfolio diversification. This suggests that the portfolio under-
diversification is not due to the need to hedge non-financial income risk. Quite the contrary, for 
the high wealth investors the negative correlation suggests familiarity-based investment or 
knowledge spill-over as an explanation for under-diversification.   
Therefore, the relative lack of diversification in cities may not be attributed to the fact 
that cities allow investors to diversify away non-financial income risk by providing them with 
alternative occupational and professional possibilities. A possible rationalization of this is the 
fact that investors simply do not use their financial portfolio to hedge against non-financial 
income risk. In this case, the process of knowledge creation that takes place in the city just 
reduces the cost of search and increases portfolio diversification. This would be supported by 
recent findings showing that optimally choose not to hedge but invest in familiar stocks (Massa 
and Simonov, 2002).   
It is interesting to note the role played by borrowing constraints. They do not affect the 
low-wealth investors, while they do increase portfolio diversification for the high-wealth ones. 
At the aggregate level they are positively related to D1 and D2 and not related to the other proxies 
of diversification. This apparently counterintuitive result may be explained as follows. For the 
low-wealth investors, borrowing constraints mostly affect the decision to participate in the stock 
market. And indeed, from the estimation of equation 3)
12 , we find that the borrowing constraints 
negatively affect stock market participation for the low-wealth investors. For the high-wealth 
investors, instead, the borrowing constraints, while not sufficient to prevent stock market 
participation, induce the investors to reduce the financial exposure of their portfolio. This 
additional prudence increases the degree of financial diversification.   
                                                 
12 Not reported, but available upon request.   26 
To this point, both the limited information theory and the city agglomeration ones seem 
to be supported by the data. However, if we consider variables that proxy for the “degree of 
isolation”, we find that, all else equal, portfolio diversification increases with isolation. That is, 
the further away an investor is from an urban center, the lower his connection to the rest of the 
world is and the less densely populated the district where he lives is, the more diversified his 
portfolio. In particular, one standard deviation increase in population density leads to a decrease 
of 2.46% in the number of risky assets held (D1), a 1% increase in average correlation between 
assets (D2) and a 7.5-8% increase in concentration as measured by D 3 and D 4. These results are 
contrary to what the limited information theory would predict
13, while they are consistent with 
the city-agglomeration and knowledge spill-over explanations. 
To sum up, the local district affects the investors in two ways, on the one hand, the 
process of professional specialization that takes place in the city reduces the drive to 
diversification. On the other hand, the very same of process of knowledge creation reduces the 
search costs and may also increase portfolio diversification. We now move on to directly study 
portfolio choice. 
 
6.2 Familiarity and city agglomeration 
 We regress our measures of familiarity – i.e., professional and geographical proximity – 
on the proxies for local professional specialization, local prosperity, financial and municipal 
service availability and the non-financial risk variables, as well as a set of control variables 
meant to control for investors’ idiosyncratic wealth, income and demographic characteristics and 
for geographic and country shocks.  
As before, we consider a specification based on the aggregated sample and one where the 
sample has been broken down into high and low wealth investors. The results are reported in 
Tables 7-9. In particular, Table 7 contains the main specification for both geographical and 
professional proximity for the entire sample. Tables 8 and 9 report the estimates for the low and 
high wealth investors, for geographical and professional proximity respectively. For each class of 
investors we consider four alternative specifications differing on the basis of the control 
                                                 
13 They would actually lend some support to standard portfolio theory. Indeed, the more isolated the investor is, the 
higher is the probability that he will not be able to hedge away his income or professional idiosyncratic shock and, 
therefore, the more diversified he should be.   27 
variables that are used. The results show that that the same variables that determine the degree of 
portfolio under-diversification are also those which affect investors’ familiarity bias.  
As a preliminary check, we consider the relationship between familiarity and hedging. 
Our working hypothesis is that familiarity should be negatively related to hedging as 
professional specialization induces investment in stocks that are professionally and 
geographically closer. This induces a behavior opposite to that required by hedging. And indeed, 
the relationship between our measures of familiarity and the indexes of non-financial risk show, 
that, as expected, hedging is negatively related to familiarity. That is, the more the investors 
choose familiar stocks, the more they tilt their financial portfolio away from the optimal 
composition required to hedge non-financial income risk. This suggests that familiarity is not due 
to hedging.  
Let us now consider our measures of professional specialization and city agglomeration. 
The main finding is a significant positive correlation between both measures of familiarity and 
our measures of professional specialization. This relationship is strong, statistically significant 
and holds across all the specifications, for the overall sample and for both classes of investors in 
the case of competition and specialization. It is less significant for specialization. This may be 
due, as it was the case in the previous section, to the relatively high correlation between this 
variable and the diversity variable. These results suggest that the higher the degree of 
professional specialization of the district, the more the investors of such a district tend to invest 
in familiar stocks.  This holds for both geographical and professional proximity. In particular, 
one standard deviation increase in competition (diversity) results in the portfolio being 1.9 (1.7) 
times "closer" to the investor as measured by value-weighted portfolio proximity. It also results 
in increase of probability of investors choosing the professionally related stocks by 2.1% (6.0%).   
If we then consider the variables that proxy for the degree of isolation, we find that, all 
else equal, the more isolated the investors are, the more they tend to invest in stocks 
professionally and geographically close to them. That is, the further away an investor is from a 
big center, the less connected he is to the rest of the world and the less densely populated the 
district where he lives is, the more he will invest in nearby stocks. Living in a municipality with 
a population density one standard deviation away from the national mean results in the portfolio 
being 1.6 times closer to the investor. These results hold across investors (overall and for the 
different classes) and for different specifications.    28 
The findings on the measures of local prosperity are also interesting. Investment in 
familiar stocks increases with the number of new start-ups and the local sales profitability, while 
it decreases with the number of local bankruptcies, number of active enterprises and return on 
capital. Employment growth reduces familiarity for the low-wealth investors, while, for the high-
wealth investors, it reduces familiarity for the case of geographical proximity and seems to 
increase it for professional proximity. While in general higher prosperity seems to reduce the 
impact of familiarity, three measures of prosperity  – new start-ups, bankruptcies and sales 
profitability – seem to go in the opposite direction and increase familiarity.
14 These variables are  
proxies for the “entrepreneurial dimension” of the district. As we mentioned before, a local 
investor in Silicon Valley would tend to invest in companies that are geographically and 
professionally close to him due to the fact that he is likely to be linked to these start-ups and to 
their profitability. Therefore, in general, local prosperity by increasing wealth and, therefore, 
financial sophistication reduces the impact of familiarity. However, if local prosperity is related 
to the local entrepreneurial dimension shared by the investor, the mere need to be part of such a 
dimension will induce the investor to invest in such shares. Finally, it is worth noting that the 
availability of financial services (bank coverage) in general reduces familiarity
15. Indeed, the 
availability of financial services is a way of increasing financial sophistication and therefore 
reducing the local bias.  
These results are consistent with the previous findings on portfolio under-diversification 
and provide a direct link between the familiarity/limited information story and the city 
agglomeration story. They suggest that the tension between professional specialization and 
prosperity also affects the exposure to the familiarity bias. The more professionally specialized 
the investors are and the more numerous the local investment opportunities where they are 
locally involved (i.e., local entrepreneurial dimension), the more they will invest in closely 
related stocks. In contrast, the richer and more prosperous the area where they live, the greater 
and the easier the access to information, the lower is the search cost and therefore the lower is 
the impact of the familiarity bias. 
                                                 
14 The only exception are the high-wealth investors for the case of professional proximity. 
15 This is the case for both professional and geographical proximity for the low-wealth investors and for professional 
proximity for the high-wealth investors. Instead, it decreases familiarity for the high-wealth investors in the case of 
geographical proximity. For the latter case, we do not have a fully satisfactory explanation. We may argue that a 
better local financial coverage provide them with a quick way to act on the basis of the inside knowledge provided 
by proximity.   29 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we address the puzzle of portfolio under-diversification from a broader  
perspective, linking it to theories of labor and the urban economy.  In particular, we argue that 
portfolio under-diversification is closely related to factors linked to knowledge creation and spill-
over in the urban environment.  We showed that the processes of professional specialization and 
knowledge spillover that characterizes city agglomeration on the one hand reduce the availability 
of time to collect and analyze financial information and by the same token increases the relative 
information that an investor has with respect to stocks closer – professionally or geographically – 
to him.  The net effect of these two factors appears to be that investors in an information-rich 
urban professional environment   -- educated though they may be --  appear to diversify less.   
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Appendix: Construction of income-related variables 
 
Here, we briefly describe the methodology we follow to construct proxies for permanent 
non-financial income, its volatility and its correlation to financial and real estate income. We 
follow the approach of Carroll and Samwick (1997) and Vissing-Jørgensen (2001). We consider 
as non-financial income: labor income and entrepreneurial income. In particular, we define the 
relevant moments of long term investor's non-financial income: 
E(? it|? it-1, Xit-1), Var(? it|? it-1, Xit-1) and ?it, 
where ?it is the non-financial income of investor i at time t, X it-1 are the variables that can be 
used to predict income next period and ?it is the conditional correlation between shocks to log 
non-financial income and the log stock return. We assume that non-financial income follows: 
ln? it = pit+?it, 
where: 
pit = git+pit-1+?it, ?it~N(0,s et
2), ?it~N(0,s ?i
2), 
and  
cov(?it, ?is) = 0, cov(?it, ?is) = 0, cov(?it, ?is) = 0 for each t, s. 
The variable pit represents the permanent income component of non-financial income. It has a 
drift term (git) that is known and based on the information available at t-1. This allows us to 
write: 
ln? it-ln? it-1 = pit-pit-1+?it-?it-1  = git+ ?it-?it-1+?it , 
or 
ln? it  = ln? it-1 + git+ ?it + ?it - ?it-1 
This implies: 
E(? it|? it-1, Xit-1)   =   ln? it-1 + git  =  ? i,t-1 Git exp{Jit /2} 
Var(? it|? it-1, Xit-1)   =  (? i,t-1 Git)
2 exp(Jit) { exp(Jit) - 1}, 
where: 
Git = exp(git), Jit =  s ?i
2+2s ?i
2 
and Xi,t-1 is the set of variables usable to predict git. 
In order to estimate E(? it|? it-1, X it-1) and Var(? it|? it-1, X it-1), we use data for the period 
1990-2000, with a 5-year lagged rolling window. Following the Carrol and Samwick (1997) and 
Vissing-Jørgensen (2001) methodologies, we regress ln? it - ln? it-1 on the set of explanatory   31 
variables X i,t-1 and use the predicted values of such a regression as an estimate of g it and the 
residuals as an estimate of ? it+?it-?it-1. The correlation between financial and non-financial 
income (?it) is constructed as the conditional correlation between shocks to log non-financial 
income (?it+?it-?it-1) and the log gross stock returns (i.e., ln(1+Rt)). We use rolling five year 
windows to estimate the parameters.   
The set of variables contained in Xi,t-1 are: demographic variables (secondary education, 
higher education, age, age squared, marriage status, size of the household, number of adults 
belonging to the household), changes in the demographic variables, industry dummies for the 
company the investor is working  for (e.g., oil industry), dummies for the type of profession of 
the investor (e.g., doctor), emigration status. Following Vissing-Jørgensen (2002a), given the 
potential inaccuracy of estimates based on few observations, we calculate the correlation over the 
entire sample.   32 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
This table contains the descriptive statistics of the sample. Panel A reports the general demographic characteristics 
(number of households for each year, members in household, adults in household, age of the oldest member of 
household, percentage of the sample with secondary and higher education, percentage of immigrants). Panel B 
describes local characteristics. We used 289 municipalities for 1999-2000 and 288 for 1995-1998.  We also report 
descriptive statistics for our  measures of diversification  D1 = N ,  D2 = - 1/N  -(1-1/N)  Corr , 
( )    , w w D
N
1 i
2
mkt i 3 ￿
=
- - = and  ( )   , w w D
N
1 i
2
ffl i 4 ￿
=
- - = where N is number of positions in the portfolio, Corr  
is average correlation of stocks in the portfolio, wi is the weight of the stock in the portfolio of the investor, wmkt is the 
weight that the same stock would have in the market portfolio, and wffl is the weight that the same stock would have in 
the free float portfolio.  Specialization is the share of the top five industries in local employment to the share of the top 
five industries in national employment (source: Statistics Sweden).  Competition is the number of firm per employee 
incorporated in a municipality relative to the number of firms per employee in Sweden (sources: Statistics Sweden, 
MM Partners). Diversity is the negative of the share of the top 5 industries in municipal employment (source: Statistics 
Sweden). Active enterprises is number (in thousands) of active firms in municipality in a given year (source: MM 
Partners).  Start-ups and  Bankruptcies measure percent of failed (ceased business activities) and started firms in 
municipality in a given year as percentage of active firms (source: MM Partners).  Profitability and Return on Capital 
are sales-weighted average of profitability and return on capital of the enterprises in municipality (source: MM 
Partners). Employment growth is growth of employment in municipality w.r.t. 1985 (source: Statistics Sweden).Index 
of Rural Areas is a code that is set by Statistics Sweden from 1 (Metropolitan area) to 9 (countryside). Distance from 
Airport is measured as logarithm of the distance between closest civilian airport and central post office in municipality 
(sources: Cartesia Informationsteknik AB, Swedish Civil Aviation Board). Population Density is population (in tens of 
thousands) per square kilometer (source: Statistics Sweden).  Bank Coverage is logarithm of number of credit 
institutions’ branches in municipality (source: MM Partners). Percent of population on welfare assistance and Percent 
of municipal employees are provided by Statistics Sweden. Panel C reports the age and gender distribution of the 
sample. Panel D reports the percentage of the households paying wealth tax, having labor income, having 
entrepreneurial income and having real estate wealth. We report mean, standard deviation, median and inter-quartile 
range (IQR). They have been calculated over the whole sample (i.e., across-investors and time). The column 
“Representation in the sample” reports the fraction of households in the sample who pay wealth tax, earn labor or 
entrepreneurial income or hold real estate wealth. The other columns report statistics (Mean, Standard Deviation, IQR, 
Maximum) of, respectively, the value wealth, labor and entrepreneurial income gross yearly income) and real estate.  
All monetary values are in Swedish krowns (SEK). 
 
Panel A: General demographic characteristics 
 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Std.Dev. 
 
IQR 
 
Maximum 
 
 
Number of households  292,901  291,913  647  686  293,320 
# of members in household  2.67  2.00  1.51  3.00  16.00 
# of adults in household  1.77  2.00  0.69  1.00  9.00 
Age of oldest household member  49.28  47  17  24  107 
% with secondary education  43.5%  43.5%  0.6%  0.5%  44.3% 
% with higher education  31.4%  31.2%  1.4%  1.4%  33.7% 
% of immigrants 
 
16.4% 
 
16.3% 
 
2.7% 
 
4.6% 
 
19.3% 
 
D1  1.63  1.00  1.78  0.00  68.00 
D2  -0.87  -1.00  0.23  0.00  0.33 
D3  -0.98  -0.88  0.60  0.61  -3.1E-7 
D4  -0.96  -0.95  0.50  0.61  -1.6E-7   38 
 
Panel B: Characteristics of the local district 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
I. Q. R. 
 
Maximum 
 
 
Active Enterprises  0.795  0.239  1.947  0.406  12.589 
Competition  1.934  1.874  0.466  0.708  3.778 
Specialization  1.618  1.519  0.463  0.389  6.521 
Diversity  -0.230  -0.230  0.023  0.024  -0.114 
Bankruptcies  0.717  0.746  1.457  0.299  13.750 
Start-ups  0.501  0.512  1.427  0.263  9.750 
Sale Profitability  0.103  0.091  0.154  0.040  2.746 
Return on Capital  0.046  0.001  0.107  0.008  1.128 
Employment Growth  -0.094  -0.097  0.118  0.133  0.426 
% of Population on Welfare Asst.  0.075  0.073  0.031  0.038  0.161 
% of Municipal Employees  0.065  0.065  0.011  0.015  0.104 
Index of Rural Areas  3.544  3.000  2.104  3.000  9.000 
Distance from Airport  8.425  8.909  1.538  2.622  10.874 
Population Density  0.609  0.078  1.159  0.516  3.971 
Bank Coverage  1.768  1.792  0.711  0.811  5.501 
 
 
Panel C: Age and gender distribution of the sample 
 
Age 
 
Males 
 
Females 
 
Age of oldest 
household member 
 
 
0-19  18.2%  17.2%  0.5% 
20-29  4.8%  4.9%  10.7% 
30-39  7.1%  8.2%  21.7% 
40-49  7.4%  7.4%  23.6% 
50-59  5.9%  5.3%  17.9% 
60+  6.6%  7.2%  25.8% 
 
Total 
 
49.9% 
 
50.2% 
 
100% 
 
 
Panel D: Wealth and income characteristics of the households 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Representation 
in the sample 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Std.Dev. 
 
I. Q. R. 
 
Maximum 
 
Wealth-Tax Payers  7.9% 
 
359,592  102,700  2,648,521  353,400  1,023,147,857 
Real Estate Holders  54.6%  449,400  387,000  348,736  340,000  78,140,000 
Labor Income Earners  100.0%  321,489  287,722  237,526  276,190  43,445,271 
Entrepr. Income Earners  9.8%  88,114  43,268  172,565  111,726  7,320,000 
               39 
Table 2: Measures of diversification for overall sample 
We report the results for the full specification where the dependent variables are measures of diversification  D1 = N,  D2 =- 
1/N  -(1-1/N)  Corr ,  ( )    , w w D
N
1 i
2
mkt i 3 ￿
=
- - = and  ( )   , w w D
N
1 i
2
ffl i 4 ￿
=
- - = where  N is number of positions in the 
portfolio, Corr  is average correlation of stocks in the portfolio, wi is the weight of the stock in the portfolio of the investor, 
wmkt is the weight that the same stock would have in the market portfolio, and wffl is the weight that the same stock would have 
in the free float portfolio. The main variables are as described in Table 1, while the control variables are described in the text. 
We also control in each specification for consumer confidence and local tax rate (not reported). t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. We also report the Adjusted R
2. All the coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
 
 
D1  D2  D3  D4 
Variable  Coeff. t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat 
                 
Local Professional Specialization 
Competition  -7.50 (-7.18)  -0.88  (-7.14)  -1.84  (-6.57)  -2.17  (-9.39) 
Specialization  -3.80 (-3.30)  -0.35  (-2.57)  -1.70  (-5.50)  -1.61  (-6.34) 
Diversity  -58.80 (-2.81)  -8.69  (-3.52)  10.62  (1.90)  3.30  (0.72) 
 
Degree of Local Isolation 
Population Density  -22.96 (-1.25)  -6.35  (-2.86)  -39.06  (-7.81)  -41.87  (-10.21) 
Index of Rural Areas  1.90 (5.63)  0.14  (3.61)  0.49  (5.49)  0.39  (5.36) 
Distance from Airport  2.70 (7.15)  0.25  (5.55)  0.47  (4.59)  0.40  (4.72) 
                 
Local Prosperity 
Bankruptcies  -41.10 (-27.00)  -4.33  (-24.48)  -2.42  (-6.16)  -3.65  (-11.26) 
Start-ups  37.20 (25.56)  3.94  (23.17)  2.09  (5.50)  3.27  (10.42) 
Sale Profitability  17.10 (6.01)  1.95  (5.82)  1.07  (1.41)  0.20  (0.32) 
Return on Capital  27.09 (4.63)  5.51  (7.91)  17.40  (10.75)  17.50  (13.13) 
Employment Growth  66.10 (13.65)  8.72  (15.40)  6.61  (5.19)  11.42  (10.88) 
Active Enterprises  -1.89 (-5.85)  -0.10  (-2.85)  0.39  (4.74)  0.29  (4.10) 
                 
Financial Services Availability 
Bank Coverage  4.50 (6.34)  0.77  (9.14)  1.64  (8.52)  1.53  (9.69) 
% of public employees  -101.70 (-1.86)  8.63  (1.31)  178.14  (11.55)  160.81  (12.72) 
                 
Non-Financial Risk and Financial Constraints 
Active Hedging Index  -10.01 (-11.80)  -1.53  (-14.14)  -1.43  (-5.29)  -1.50  (-6.81) 
Borrowing Constraints  0.13 (2.58)  0.02  (3.49)  -0.01  (-0.34)  0.00  (-0.11) 
% of population on welfare asst.  74.90 (3.59)  -0.72  (-0.29)  -65.38  (-11.58)  -62.79  (-13.53) 
         
Wealth Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Income Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Momentum Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Demographic Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Macro and Social Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Lambda  -251.10 (-37.46)  -22.58  (-29.09)  -7.04  (-4.10)  -15.38  (-10.84) 
Constant  668.08 (37.27)  -46.83  (-22.14)  -69.64  (-14.49)  -58.96  (-14.92) 
Adj R2  0.057  0.064  0.115  0.178   40 
Table 3: Dependent variable D1 
We report the results for the specification where the dependent variable D1 = N where N is number of positions in the portfolio.  We report results for Low and High-wealth households.  
In each case, four different specifications are reported.  The main variables are as described in Table 1, while the control variables are described in the text. We also control in each 
specification for consumer confidence and local tax rate (not reported).  T-statistics is reported in parentheses. We also report adjusted R
2. All the coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
  Low-wealth households  High-wealth households 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variable  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat 
Local Professional Specialization 
Competition  -2.61  (-4.97)  -1.72  (-3.40)  -1.68  (-3.36)  -2.36  (-4.64)  -6.38  (-1.93)  -1.38  (-0.52)  -7.34  (-2.04)  -2.03  (-0.78) 
Specialization  -1.65  (-2.83)  -1.52  (-2.67)  -1.38  (-2.44)  -1.44  (-2.51)  -7.11  (-1.96)  -4.11  (-1.41)  -7.6  (-1.92)  -4.52  (-1.57) 
Diversity  -31.2  (-2.96)  -21.55  (-2.10)  -21.65  (-2.12)  -29.98  (-2.89)  -71.54  (-1.08)  -21.72  (-0.41)  -100.53  (-1.40)  -40.22  (-0.77) 
Degree of Local Isolation 
  Population Density  -0.82  (-0.08)  7.15  (0.75)  5.44  (0.57)  0.99  (0.10)  20  (0.41)  20  (0.53)  10  (0.22)  10  (0.29) 
Index of Rural Areas  0.52  (3.16)  0.22  (1.36)  0.13  (0.83)  0.32  (1.99)  -1.89  (-1.85)  3.19  (3.86)  1.15  (1.04)  3.37  (4.13) 
Distance from Airport  0.76  (4.04)  0.56  (3.05)  0.48  (2.67)  0.67  (3.66)  5.84  (4.48)  2.15  (2.12)  7.03  (4.97)  1.63  (1.66) 
Local Prosperity 
Bankruptcies  -9.82  (-13.05)  -6.16  (-9.53)  -5.4  (-10.29)  -8.2  (-14.47)  -52.6  (-9.87)  -18.72  (-5.15)  -63.96  (-11.14)  -17.67  (-5.58) 
Start-ups  8.78  (12.18)  5.53  (8.74)  4.83  (9.04)  7.33  (12.88)  50.57  (9.69)  18.25  (5.08)  61.45  (10.93)  17.15  (5.43) 
Sales Profitability  3.24  (2.29)  1.67  (1.21)  1.14  (0.84)  2.35  (1.71)  27.9  (2.97)  1.2  (0.16)  36.93  (3.63)  -1.14  (-0.16) 
Return on Capital   18.4  (6.02)  17.7  (5.91)  17.7  (5.92)  18  (5.95)  25  (1.37)  28.1  (1.86)  24.9  (1.26)  27.8  (1.86) 
Employment Growth  24.87  (10.17)  20.83  (8.99)  18.91  (8.31)  22.94  (10.00)  120.56  (7.22)  47.41  (3.83)  142.93  (7.89)  37.25  (3.20) 
Active Enterprises   0.55  (3.32)  0.70  (4.37)  0.76  (4.79)  0.67  (4.10)  -4.10  (-4.45)  -2.80  (-3.86)  -4.60  (-4.59)  -2.70  (-3.66) 
Financial and Municipal Services Availability 
Bank Coverage  1.70  (4.68)  1.52  (4.28)  1.44  (4.08)  1.58  (4.41)  7.95  (3.49)  7.85  (4.26)  8.36  (3.38)  8.03  (4.41) 
% of Municipal Employees  46.19  (1.63)  44.55  (1.60)  51.07  (1.84)  43.37  (1.54)  -333.14  (-1.88)  -278.93  (-1.85)  -359.25  (-1.89)  -239.05  (-1.60) 
Non-financial Risk and Financial Constraints 
Active Hedging Index  0.98  (1.76)  1.17  (1.10)  1.04  (1.76)  1.16  (1.68)  -17.56  (-8.58)  -16.16  (-8.07)  -17.88  (-8.63)  -16.2  (-8.11) 
Borrowing Constraints  0.03  (1.27)  0.03  (1.09)  0.02  (1.00)  0.03  (1.26)  69.88  (5.32)  58.11  (5.23)  62.35  (4.47)  61.15  (5.71) 
% of Population on Welfare Asst.  22.46  (2.13)  -0.57  (-0.06)  -3.53  (-0.36)  19.55  (1.94)  -106.3  (-1.66)  -233.28  (-4.52)  -68.93  (-1.00)  -240.11  (-4.72) 
Control Variables 
Wealth Variables  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Income Variables  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Momentum Variables  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Demographic Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Macro and Social Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Lambda  -50.31  (-14.94)  -27.54  (-11.25)  -22.72  (-26.96)  -40.01  (-30.31)  -413.48  (-14.37)  -149.41  (-9.34)  -497.48  (-16.27)  -131.43  (-15.68) 
Constant  221.12  (23.70)  172.53  (23.89)  153.43  (29.43)  200.77  (40.09)  621.25  (15.23)  419.17  (13.32)  729.77  (17.41)  297.77  (13.27) 
Adj R2  0.037  0.033  0.035  0.035  0.053  0.047  0.052  0.048   41 
Table 4: Dependent variable D2 
We report the results for the specification where the dependent variable is the measure of diversification D2 =- 1/N -(1-1/N) Corr   where N is number of 
positions in the portfolio and Corr  is average correlation of stocks in the portfolio.  The notations are as in Table 2. All the coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
  Low-wealth households  High-wealth households 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variable  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat 
Local Professional Specialization 
Competition  -0.82  (-7.24)  -0.59  (-5.46)  -0.54  (-5.14)  -0.72  (-6.63)  -0.49  (-1.77)  -0.27  (-1.04)  -0.52  (-1.85)  -0.43  (-1.63) 
Specialization  -0.3  (-2.37)  -0.26  (-2.18)  -0.22  (-1.82)  -0.22  (-1.80)  -0.3  (-0.98)  -0.2  (-0.68)  -0.32  (-1.02)  -0.28  (-0.96) 
Diversity  -7.24  (-3.18)  -4.73  (-2.16)  -4.4  (-2.04)  -6.53  (-2.95)  -9.95  (-1.79)  -6.91  (-1.32)  -10.89  (-1.92)  -6.68  (-1.25) 
Degree of Local Isolation 
Population Density  -6.22  (-2.95)  -4.36  (-2.15)  -4.34  (-2.16)  -5.71  (-2.78)  -3.23  (-0.69)  -3.58  (-0.80)  -3.51  (-0.73)  -4.72  (-1.03) 
Index of Rural Areas  0.18  (5.02)  0.1  (2.99)  0.06  (1.89)  0.11  (3.21)  -0.16  (-1.90)  0.2  (2.40)  0.14  (1.57)  0.18  (2.12) 
Distance from Airport  0.16  (3.81)  0.1  (2.55)  0.07  (1.88)  0.12  (3.03)  0.35  (3.18)  0.22  (2.14)  0.39  (3.48)  0.26  (2.55) 
Local Prosperity 
Bankruptcies  -2.88  (-17.66)  -1.91  (-13.83)  -1.57  (-14.09)  -2.28  (-18.83)  -3.28  (-7.39)  -2.12  (-5.91)  -3.66  (-8.16)  -2.84  (-8.77) 
Start-ups  2.59  (16.58)  1.72  (12.78)  1.41  (12.49)  2.05  (16.87)  3.18  (7.30)  2.07  (5.84)  3.54  (8.05)  2.75  (8.52) 
Sales Profitability  1.27  (4.16)  0.84  (2.87)  0.65  (2.25)  0.94  (3.20)  1.7  (2.14)  0.75  (1.02)  2  (2.47)  1.29  (1.75) 
Return on Capital   4.7  (7.09)  4.5  (7.08)  4.4  (7.02)  4.5  (7.02)  5  (3.20)  5.3  (3.57)  5  (3.14)  5  (3.30) 
Employment Growth  6.35  (12.01)  5.19  (10.52)  4.58  (9.50)  5.59  (11.43)  8.69  (6.22)  6.12  (5.02)  9.45  (6.64)  6.98  (5.87) 
Active Enterprises   0.11  (3.18)  0.16  (4.54)  0.18  (5.25)  0.16  (4.47)  -0.31  (-3.99)  -0.27  (-3.76)  -0.33  (-4.12)  -0.28  (-3.84) 
Financial and Municipal Services Availability 
Bank Coverage  0.58  (7.36)  0.54  (7.08)  0.5  (6.69)  0.55  (7.23)  0.76  (3.96)  0.79  (4.32)  0.78  (3.96)  0.91  (4.91) 
% of Municipal Employees  23.75  (3.90)  24.25  (4.09)  25.17  (4.27)  23.23  (3.89)  2.59  (0.17)  6  (0.40)  1.69  (0.11)  5.98  (0.39) 
Non-financial Risk and Financial Constraints 
Active Hedging Index  -0.04  (-0.37)  0.01  (0.05)  -0.03  (-0.22)  0.03  (0.23)  -2.58  (-12.87)  -2.52  (-12.63)  -2.59  (-12.91)  -2.41  (-12.08) 
Borrowing Constraints  0.01  (2.79)  0.01  (2.56)  0.01  (2.39)  0.01  (2.72)  12.84  (11.14)  12.73  (11.57)  12.55  (10.81)  15.7  (14.45) 
% of Population on Welfare Asst.  4.14  (1.82)  -1.95  (-0.90)  -3.55  (-1.69)  2.15  (1.00)  -17.19  (-3.17)  -22.07  (-4.33)  -15.87  (-2.87)  -21.67  (-4.18) 
Control Variables 
Wealth Variables  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Income Variables  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Momentum Variables  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Demographic Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Macro and Social Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Lambda  -13.42  (-18.38)  -7.33  (-14.04)  -5.22  (-29.26)  -9.56  (-34.00)  -21.75  (-8.91)  -12.63  (-8.01)  -24.6  (-10.07)  -17.13  (-20.05) 
Constant  -64.29  (-31.92)  -77.97  (-50.71)  -84.33  (-76.38)  -73.39  (-68.82)  -45.27  (-12.53)  -53.12  (-17.05)  -41.44  (-11.72)  -65.15  (-28.48) 
Adj R2  0.0333  0.0288  0.0310  0.0290  0.0400  0.0366  0.0399  0.0357   42 
Table 5: Dependent variable D3 
We report the results for the specification where the dependent variable is the measure of diversification  ( )    , w w D
N
1 i
2
mkt i 3 ￿
=
- - = where wi is the weight of the 
stock in the portfolio of the investor and wmkt is the weight that the same stock would have in the market portfolio.  The notations are as in Table 2. All the 
coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
  Low-wealth households  High-wealth households 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variable  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat 
Local Professional Specialization 
Competition  -2.28  (-9.44)  -2.31  (-9.69)  -2.04  (-8.64)  -2.62  (-10.91)  -0.78  (-1.02)  -0.76  (-1.00)  -0.48  (-0.61)  -1.42  (-1.88) 
Specialization  -1.17  (-4.38)  -1.22  (-4.56)  -1.1  (-4.10)  -1.18  (-4.34)  -1.98  (-2.37)  -1.97  (-2.35)  -1.84  (-2.11)  -2.75  (-3.30) 
Diversity  -4.46  (-0.92)  -4.1  (-0.85)  -6.72  (-1.40)  -0.39  (-0.08)  23.37  (1.53)  23.75  (1.56)  31.61  (1.99)  11.42  (0.75) 
Degree of Local Isolation 
Population Density  -42  (-9.30)  -43.74  (-9.71)  -41  (-9.14)  -44  (-9.62)  -44  (-3.36)  -45  (-3.45)  -41  (-3.06)  -45  (-3.47) 
Index of Rural Areas  -0.08  (-1.07)  -0.01  (-0.19)  0.17  (2.32)  0.07  (0.92)  1.34  (5.62)  1.33  (5.61)  1.55  (6.29)  1.03  (4.39) 
Distance from Airport  0.48  (5.53)  0.48  (5.58)  0.41  (4.80)  0.58  (6.72)  -0.01  (-0.03)  -0.06  (-0.22)  -0.35  (-1.14)  0.64  (2.24) 
Local Prosperity 
Bankruptcies  -1.65  (-4.80)  -1.87  (-6.16)  -0.57  (-2.31)  -3.2  (-11.94)  1.29  (1.06)  1.57  (1.51)  4.54  (3.63)  -4.89  (-5.36) 
Start-ups  1.42  (4.28)  1.61  (5.42)  0.45  (1.78)  2.79  (10.37)  -1.62  (-1.36)  -1.89  (-1.84)  -4.73  (-3.86)  4.32  (4.75) 
Sales Profitability  1.08  (1.66)  1.17  (1.81)  0.56  (0.88)  1.98  (3.05)  -2.92  (-1.33)  -3.16  (-1.48)  -5.51  (-2.43)  2.37  (1.13) 
Return on Capital   15.7  (11.06)  16.1  (11.34)  15.6  (11.02)  15.9  (11.11)  19  (4.38)  19.4  (4.46)  19  (4.23)  19  (4.39) 
Employment Growth  6.95  (6.19)  6.76  (6.19)  5.44  (5.07)  10.09  (9.31)  -6.12  (-1.60)  -7.05  (-1.99)  -12.49  (-3.15)  8.03  (2.39) 
Active Enterprises   0.55  (7.27)  0.54  (7.13)  0.61  (8.06)  0.47  (6.16)  0.41  (1.91)  0.42  (1.98)  0.55  (2.48)  0.13  (0.61) 
Financial and Municipal Services Availability 
Bank Coverage  1.52  (9.12)  1.62  (9.69)  1.45  (8.69)  1.57  (9.27)  1.42  (2.69)  1.44  (2.73)  1.29  (2.34)  1.85  (3.52) 
% of Municipal Employees  166.27  (12.62)  171.62  (13.03)  168.29  (12.79)  161.26  (12.12)  249.3  (5.73)  252.46  (5.79)  256.8  (5.74)  235.39  (5.41) 
Non-financial Risk and Financial Constraints 
Active Hedging Index  -0.30  (-1.13)  -0.27  (-1.02)  -0.28  (-1.07)  -0.27  (-1.04)  -2.15  (-3.65)  -2.15  (-3.65)  -2.06  (-3.47)  -2.15  (-3.66) 
Borrowing Constraints  -0.01  (-0.82)  -0.01  (-0.74)  -0.01  (-0.97)  -0.01  (-0.56)  13.12  (4.05)  12.91  (4.01)  15.62  (4.74)  21.55  (6.92) 
% of Population on Welfare Asst.  43.51  (8.93)  43.1  (9.02)  50.89  (10.87)  32.91  (6.90)  -92.89  (-6.20)  -93.62  (-6.30)  -104.01  (-6.71)  -78.97  (-5.36) 
Control Variables 
Wealth Variables  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Income Variables  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Momentum Variables  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Demographic Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Macro and Social Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Lambda  -5.94  (-3.86)  -6.93  (-6.02)  0.78  (1.99)  -16.33  (-26.18)  24.63  (3.65)  27.31  (5.95)  48.71  (7.10)  -23.08  (-9.51) 
Constant  -84.45  (-19.68)  -85.68  (-25.17)  -102.72  (-41.65)  -67.86  (-28.66)  1.41  (0.14)  -3.77  (-0.41)  -31.11  (-3.08)  -27.3  (-4.20) 
Adj R2  0.226  0.225  0.226  0.226  0.042  0.015  0.040  0.038   43 
Table 6: Dependent variable D4 
We report the results for the specification where the dependent variable is the measure of diversification  ( )   , w w D
N
1 i
2
ffl i 4 ￿
=
- - = where wi is the weight of the 
stock in the portfolio of the investor and wffl is the weight that the same stock would have in the free float portfolio.  The notations are as in Table 2. All the 
coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
  Low-wealth households  High-wealth households 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variable  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat 
Local Professional Specialization 
Competition  -2.28  (-11.67)  -2.06  (-10.74)  -2.00  (-10.54)  -2.53  (-12.92)  -2.20  (-3.58)  -1.65  (-2.73)  -1.71  (-2.79)  -2.14  (-3.50) 
Specialization  -1.20  (-5.52)  -1.18  (-5.46)  -1.12  (-5.19)  -1.23  (-5.54)  -2.24  (-3.31)  -1.83  (-2.74)  -1.87  (-2.78)  -2.47  (-3.66) 
Diversity  -0.25  (-0.06)  -2.01  (-0.52)  -2.62  (-0.68)  3.58  (0.89)  -2.66  (-0.22)  13.97  (1.15)  15.55  (1.27)  5.44  (0.44) 
Degree of Local Isolation 
Population Density  -41.00  (-11.13)  -40.00  (-10.95)  -39.00  (-10.84)  -42.00  (-11.26)  -50.20  (-4.80)  -51.00  (-4.92)  -47.00  (-4.53)  -50.00  (-4.76) 
Index of Rural Areas  -0.06  (-1.00)  -0.14  (-1.33)  0.18  (3.04)  0.04  (0.72)  0.91  (4.75)  1.10  (5.78)  1.19  (6.25)  0.90  (4.71) 
Distance from Airport  0.38  (5.34)  0.29  (4.20)  0.29  (4.24)  0.46  (6.43)  0.50  (2.06)  -0.02  (-0.09)  -0.04  (-0.17)  0.51  (2.19) 
Local Prosperity 
Bankruptcies  -2.32  (-8.29)  -1.17  (-4.80)  -0.98  (-4.91)  -3.48  (-15.84)  -5.10  (-5.19)  -0.62  (-0.75)  -0.07  (-0.08)  -5.27  (-7.12) 
Start-ups  2.00  (7.43)  0.97  (4.07)  0.80  (3.93)  3.03  (13.76)  4.79  (4.97)  0.50  (0.61)  -0.03  (-0.03)  4.97  (6.73) 
Sales Profitability  0.90  (1.70)  0.36  (0.69)  0.26  (0.50)  1.55  (2.91)  -1.98  (-1.12)  -5.57  (-3.26)  -5.96  (-3.39)  -1.62  (-0.95) 
Return on Capital   15.10  (13.15)  15.10  (13.29)  14.90  (13.13)  15.20  (13.06)  18.80  (5.35)  19.40  (5.58)  18.90  (5.41)  19.00  (5.39) 
Employment Growth  9.66  (10.60)  7.99  (9.13)  7.83  (9.07)  11.90  (13.40)  11.62  (3.75)  1.61  (0.57)  1.17  (0.38)  12.74  (4.68) 
Active Enterprises   0.45  (7.33)  0.51  (8.31)  0.52  (8.58)  0.39  (6.28)  0.10  (0.57)  0.29  (1.73)  0.32  (1.90)  0.08  (0.45) 
Financial and Municipal Services Availability 
Bank Coverage  1.45  (10.69)  1.42  (10.62)  1.36  (10.21)  1.48  (10.69)  1.07  (2.51)  1  (2.37)  0.93  (2.20)  1.21  (2.83) 
% of Municipal Employees  156.24  (14.66)  160.34  (15.18)  158.11  (14.96)  152.45  (14.08)  213.15  (6.06)  225.09  (6.45)  222.95  (6.37)  209.83  (5.96) 
Non-financial Risk and Financial Constraints 
Active Hedging Index  0.07  (0.30)  0.08  (0.37)  0.08  (0.39)  0.04  (0.20)  -2.4  (-5.05)  -2.27  (-4.79)  -2.27  (-4.78)  -2.44  (-5.13) 
Borrowing Constraints  -0.01  (-0.88)  -0.01  (-1.01)  -0.01  (-1.10)  -0.01  (-0.68)  13.22  (5.06)  11.16  (4.33)  12.65  (4.90)  14.87  (5.90) 
% of Population on Welfare Asst.  44.99  (11.39)  51.68  (13.49)  53.33  (14.18)  37.01  (9.50)  -71.56  (-5.91)  -86.49  (-7.29)  -87.65  (-7.29)  -74.61  (-6.25) 
Control Variables 
Wealth Variables  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Income Variables  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Momentum Variables  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Demographic Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Macro and Social Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Lambda  -11.6  (-9.27)  -4.07  (-4.41)  -3.23  (-10.09)  -19.36  (-37.93)  -21.76  (-3.99)  13.54  (3.70)  16.48  (3.10)  -23.2  (-11.79) 
Constant  -74.61  (-21.42)  -94.23  (-34.53)  -95.93  (-48.43)  -61.35  (-31.71)  18.51  (2.25)  -13.27  (-1.82)  -16.92  (-2.14)  -29.6  (-5.62) 
Adj R2  0.313  0.312  0.313  0.313  0.067  0.066  0.066  0.064   44 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Measures of proximity for overall sample 
 
We report the results for the specification where the dependent variables are our measures of 
geographical and professional proximity. Geographical proximity is measured as value-
weighted average of inverse of the logarithm of the  distance between the ZIP code of the 
investor and the ZIP code of the closest branch/subsidiary of the company whose stock we 
consider.  Professional proximity f or each position it takes value 1 if any of the household 
members are employed in the same industry of the company they are investing in. For investor 
the measure is computed as value-weighted average over all position in household portfolio. 
The notations are as in Table 2. 
 
  Geographical proximity  Professional proximity 
Variable  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat 
 
Local Professional Specialization 
Competition  0.577  (34.18)  0.046  (24.24) 
Specialization  0.001  (58.84)  -3.295  (-1.54) 
Diversity  10.426  (33.36)  2.491  (9.58) 
Degree of Local Isolation 
Population Density  -1.284  (-4.24)  -22.200  (-10.90) 
Index of Rural Areas  0.057  (9.95)  0.088  (3.68) 
Distance from Airport  0.033  (5.49)  0.588  (8.32) 
Local Prosperity 
Bankruptcies  -4.342  (-17.11)  -0.111  (-10.28) 
Start-ups  5.146  (25.09)  0.112  (19.63) 
Sales Profitability  -0.110  (-2.41)  0.187  (17.40) 
Return on Capital   -0.037  (-38.01)  -0.002  (-19.97) 
Employment Growth  -1.226  (-15.98)  0.026  (8.02) 
Active Enterprises   0.604  (29.03)  -0.020  (-26.55) 
Financial and Municipal Services Availability 
Bank Coverage  0.052  (4.68)  -0.022  (-17.72) 
% of Municipal Employees  17.411  (19.04)  0.111  (2.99) 
Background Risk and Financial Constraints 
Active Hedging Index  -1.427  (-91.97)  -0.043  (-35.45) 
Borrowing Constraints  -0.003  (-0.40)  0.000  (0.92) 
% of Population on Welfare Asst.  -19.304  (-50.67)  0.278  (17.56) 
     
Wealth Variables  Yes  Yes 
Income Variables  Yes  Yes 
Momentum Variables  Yes  Yes 
Demographic Variables  Yes  Yes 
Macro and Social Variables  Yes  Yes 
Lambda  -2.235  (-19.93)  -0.167  (-4.64) 
Constant  -10.217  (-34.80)  0.269  (22.39) 
Adj R2  0.0792    0.0094     45 
Table 8: Dependent variable geographical proximity  
We report the results for the specification where the dependent variable is our measure of geographical proximity. It is measured as value-weighted average of 
inverse of the logarithm of the distance between the ZIP code of the investor and the ZIP code of the closest branch/subsidiary of the company whose stock we 
consider. The notations are as in Table 2.  Coefficients for Specialization are multiplied by 100. 
  Low-wealth households  High-wealth households 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variable  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat 
Local Professional Specialization 
Competition  0.751  (32.91)  0.654  (30.63)  0.751  (32.91)  0.778  (38.49)  0.059  (0.53)  0.233  (11.43)  0.056  (0.50)  0.247  (11.90) 
Specialization  0.076  (33.32)  0.042  (18.95)  0.076  (33.31)  0.065  (30.47)  0.032  (4.33)  0.041  (21.15)  0.031  (4.22)  0.046  (23.15) 
Diversity  12.703  (29.92)  12.289  (30.64)  12.702  (29.92)  12.006  (31.37)  15.593  (7.40)  3.056  (7.98)  15.613  (7.40)  2.839  (7.30) 
Degree of Local Isolation 
Population Density  -2.425  (-5.60)  0.493  (1.21)  -2.311  (-5.60)  -0.510  (-1.24)  -4.089  (-2.26)  0.160  (0.47)  -4.139  (-2.26)  -0.089  (-0.31) 
Index of Rural Areas  0.066  (8.67)  0.055  (7.95)  0.066  (8.66)  0.021  (3.24)  0.379  (10.33)  0.029  (4.36)  0.380  (10.34)  0.015  (2.21) 
Distance from Airport  0.072  (8.84)  0.091  (11.74)  0.072  (8.84)  0.078  (10.62)  0.144  (3.31)  0.047  (5.98)  0.144  (3.32)  0.040  (5.04) 
Local Prosperity 
Bankruptcies  -6.051  (-17.50)  -6.020  (-21.85)  -6.050  (-17.50)  -5.632  (-24.26)  -5.001  (-24.58)  -1.533  (-53.03)  -5.013  (-24.62)  -1.572  (-62.26) 
Start-ups  6.838  (24.31)  6.691  (25.56)  6.837  (24.30)  6.304  (27.62)  6.417  (32.50)  1.950  (68.48)  6.428  (32.54)  2.014  (80.01) 
Sales Profitability  1.860  (30.34)  4.265  (73.93)  1.861  (30.36)  2.978  (54.41)  -3.006  (-9.53)  -1.085  (-18.96)  -2.914  (-9.24)  -2.384  (-41.56) 
Return on Capital   -0.055  (-41.92)  -0.059  (-46.64)  -0.055  (-41.92)  -0.057  (-47.14)  -0.008  (-1.35)  -0.003  (-2.85)  -0.008  (-1.37)  -0.004  (-3.64) 
Employment Growth  -1.271  (-12.04)  -0.929  (-9.45)  -1.271  (-12.04)  -1.178  (-12.69)  2.234  (3.99)  0.061  (0.64)  2.235  (3.99)  -0.004  (-0.04) 
Active Enterprises   -1.028  (-12.89)  -1.074  (-15.16)  -1.028  (-14.90)  -1.070  (-16.56)  -0.160  (-5.25)  -0.094  (-16.51)  -0.158  (-5.16)  -0.111  (-18.80) 
Financial and Municipal Services Availability 
 
Bank Coverage  -0.035  (-2.30)  -0.084  (-5.79)  -0.035  (-2.30)  -0.117  (-8.53)  0.706  (9.45)  0.158  (11.36)  0.705  (9.44)  0.157  (11.12) 
% of Municipal Employees  13.840  (11.34)  6.508  (5.57)  13.838  (11.33)  8.853  (7.87)  37.464  (6.96)  11.405  (9.82)  37.369  (6.94)  12.909  (10.81) 
Non-financial Risk and Financial Constraints 
Active Hedging Index  -1.274  (-53.87)  -1.655  (-72.06)  -1.274  (-53.86)  -1.457  (-64.69)  -1.991  (-57.31)  -1.185  (-76.94)  -1.985  (-57.15)  -1.324  (-82.93) 
Borrowing Constraints  -0.012  (-1.29)  -0.014  (1.05)  -0.012  (0.74)  -0.017  (0.61)  19.797  (4.98)  7.775  (9.11)  19.775  (4.97)  8.198  (9.62) 
% of Population on Welfare Asst.  -16.884  (-32.71)  -12.127  (-24.67)  -16.881  (-32.71)  -12.129  (-25.77)  -53.340  (-21.11)  -16.186  (-34.46)  -53.273  (-21.07)  -17.161  (-35.89) 
Control Variables 
Wealth Variables  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Income Variables  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Momentum Variables  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Demographic Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Macro and Social Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Lambda  -2.767  (-16.81)  -2.086  (-19.26)  -2.767  (-16.81)  -1.068  (-20.22)  -20.716  (-18.33)  -1.150  (-8.81)  -20.729  (-18.33)  -0.944  (-14.07) 
Constant  -10.204  (-23.90)  -10.121  (-33.86)  -10.204  (-23.90)  -13.112  (-70.06)  4.090  (3.51)  -6.246  (-26.89)  4.101  (3.52)  -7.650  (-45.97) 
Adj R2  0.0594  0.0569  0.0594  0.0566  0.0732  0.0724  0.0732  0.0705 
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Table 9: Dependent variable professional proximity 
We report the results for the specification where the dependent variable is our measure of geographical proximity. For each position it takes value 1 if any of the 
household members are employed in the same industry of the company they are investing in. For investor the measure is computed as value-weighted average 
over all position in household portfolio. The notations are as in Table 2. .  Coefficients for Specialization for non-wealthy households are multiplied by 100. 
  Low-wealth households  High-wealth households 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variable  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat 
Local Professional Specialization 
Competition  0.051  (14.74)  0.040  (24.48)  0.043  (24.49)  0.010  (6.18)  0.024  (9.40)  0.010  (3.57)  0.022  (13.13)  0.012  (3.06) 
Specialization  -0.001  (-0.28)  -0.001  (-0.86)  -0.001  (-0.72)  0.001  (1.25)  -5.101  (-0.78)  -8.184  (-1.29)  -6.138  (-1.51)  0.608  (2.76) 
Diversity  0.162  (2.48)  0.177  (5.71)  0.175  (5.34)  0.120  (3.95)  1.455  (4.62)  1.789  (5.36)  2.275  (11.28)  0.253  (3.57) 
Degree of Local Isolation 
Population Density  -0.209  (-2.36)  -0.195  (-5.09)  -0.200  (-5.48)  -0.785  (-4.80)  -1.982  (-2.61)  -1.990  (-2.80)  -1.785  (-3.92)  -1.345  (-1.17) 
Index of Rural Areas  -0.270  (-0.23)  1.476  (2.71)  1.027  (1.75)  -0.020  (-0.38)  0.140  (1.63)  0.583  (6.45)  0.319  (1.99)  -0.042  (-0.35) 
Distance from Airport  0.271  (0.49)  0.050  (0.87)  0.045  (0.74)  0.043  (0.76)  0.242  (2.47)  0.389  (3.72)  0.091  (1.45)  0.431  (3.07) 
Local Prosperity 
Bankruptcies  -0.108  (-20.31)  -0.101  (-43.94)  -0.102  (-37.91)  -0.055  (-31.27)  0.042  (9.08)  0.022  (5.09)  0.022  (7.56)  0.019  (4.27) 
Start-ups  0.113  (22.42)  0.109  (49.50)  0.110  (43.10)  0.059  (33.13)  -0.023  (-5.04)  0.006  (1.55)  -0.002  (-0.57)  -0.012  (-2.66) 
Sales Profitability  -0.010  (-1.10)  0.052  (11.73)  0.041  (8.71)  -0.005  (-1.05)  0.213  (28.56)  0.273  (35.12)  0.306  (64.11)  -0.099  (-9.56) 
Return on Capital   -0.001  (-5.31)  -0.001  (-10.18)  -0.001  (-9.92)  -0.001  (-7.63)  -0.001  (-10.36)  -0.001  (-7.47)  -0.002  (-21.01)  0.000  (0.20) 
Employment Growth  -0.041  (-2.55)  -0.028  (-3.72)  -0.032  (-3.89)  -0.020  (-2.76)  0.017  (1.39)  0.051  (3.95)  -0.004  (-0.50)  0.029  (1.74) 
Active Enterprises   -0.020  (-15.81)  -0.019  (-31.48)  -0.020  (-31.54)  -0.010  (-26.74)  -0.020  (-22.69)  -0.009  (-11.16)  -0.020  (-50.73)  0.002  (1.58) 
Financial and Municipal Services Availability 
 
Bank Coverage  -0.006  (-2.71)  -0.004  (-3.91)  -0.005  (-4.43)  -0.004  (-3.55)  -0.020  (-11.38)  -0.009  (-5.00)  -0.018  (-16.52)  -0.015  (-5.86) 
% of Municipal Employees  0.001  (0.01)  0.075  (0.84)  0.089  (0.94)  0.024  (0.27)  0.310  (2.13)  0.292  (1.91)  0.280  (3.05)  0.181  (0.83) 
Non-financial Risk and Financial Constraints 
Active Hedging Index  -0.080  (-21.16)  -0.064  (-35.78)  -0.060  (-31.44)  -0.043  (-24.02)  -0.052  (-26.65)  -0.066  (-34.87)  -0.058  (-48.72)  -0.025  (-8.52) 
Borrowing Constraints  0.000  (0.14)  0.000  (0.13)  0.000  (0.09)  0.000  (-0.09)  0.483  (4.46)  0.655  (5.84)  0.384  (5.63)  0.442  (2.84) 
% of Population on Welfare Asst.  -0.525  (-6.66)  -0.444  (-11.76)  -0.438  (-11.01)  -0.048  (-1.30)  0.084  (1.44)  -0.225  (-3.61)  -0.059  (-1.58)  0.728  (8.49) 
Control Variables 
Wealth Variables  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Income Variables  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Momentum Variables  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Demographic Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Macro and Social Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Lambda  -0.088  (-3.56)  -0.102  (-10.41)  -0.092  (-7.39)  0.012  (2.81)  -0.101  (-3.72)  -0.279  (-12.93)  -0.125  (-7.20)  0.042  (3.49) 
Constant  0.130  (1.99)  0.171  (6.37)  0.134  (4.10)  -0.080  (-4.86)  -0.013  (-0.41)  0.201  (6.57)  0.000  (0.02)  -0.139  (-4.73) 
Adj R2  0.0058  0.0053  0.0057  0.0035  0.0202  0.0193  0.0196  0.0112 
 